This paper addresses the problem of non-Bayesian learning over multi-agent networks, where agents repeatedly collect partially informative observations about an unknown state of the world, and try to collaboratively learn the true state out of m alternatives. We focus on the impact of adversarial agents on the performance of consensus-based non-Bayesian learning, where non-faulty agents combine local learning updates with consensus primitives. In particular, we consider the scenario where an unknown subset of agents suffer Byzantine faults-agents suffering Byzantine faults behave arbitrarily. We propose two learning rules. In our learning rules, each non-faulty agent keeps a local variable which is a stochastic vector over the m possible states. Entries of this stochastic vector can be viewed as the scores assigned to the corresponding states by that agent. We say a non-faulty agent learns the underlying truth if it assigns one to the true state and zeros to the wrong states asymptotically.
Introduction
Decentralized hypothesis testing (learning) has received significant amount of attention [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . The traditional decen-This research is supported in part by National Science Foundation award NSF 1421918. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies or the U.S. government. A short version of this manuscript [1] has been accepted to appear in the Proceedings of the International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC), Sep, 2016. B Lili Su lilisu@mit.edu 1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 32 Vassar St, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA 2 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1308 W. Main St., Urbana, IL 61801, USA tralized detection framework consists of a collection of spatially distributed sensors and a fusion center [5] [6] [7] . The sensors independently collect noisy signals of the environment state, and send only summary of the private signals to the fusion center, where a final decision is made. In the case when the sensors directly send all the private signals, the detection problem can be solved using a centralized scheme. The above framework does not scale well, since each sensor needs to be connected to the fusion center and full reliability of the fusion center is required, which may not be practical as the system scales.
Distributed hypothesis testing in the absence of fusion center is considered in [3, [9] [10] [11] . In particular, Gale and Kariv [3] studied the distributed hypothesis testing problem in the context of social learning, where fully Bayesian belief update rule is studied. Bayesian update rule is impractical in many applications due to memory and computation constraints of each agent.
To avoid the complexity of Bayesian learning, a non-Bayesian learning framework that combines local learning with distributed consensus was proposed by Jadbabaie et al. [4] , and has attracted much attention [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Jadbabaie et al. [4] considered the general setting where external signals are observed during each iteration of the algorithm execution. Specifically, the belief of each agent is repeatedly updated as the arithmetic mean of its local Bayesian update and the beliefs of its neighbors-combining iterative consensus algorithm with local Bayesian update. It is shown [4] that, under this learning rule, each agent learns the true state almost surely asymptotically. Similar algorithm is proposed in [20] . Comparing to the algorithm in [20] , one advantage of the learning rule in [4] is that it incorporates the newly obtained private signals into learning on the fly. The publication of [4] has inspired significant efforts in designing and analyzing non-Bayesian learning rules with a particular focus on refining the fusion strategies and analyzing the (asymptotic and/or finite-time) convergence rates of the refined algorithms [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 21] . In this paper we are particularly interested in the log-linear learning rule, in which, essentially, each agent updates its belief as the geometric average of the local Bayesian update and its neighbors' beliefs [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . The log-linear learning rule is shown to converge exponentially fast [12, 15, 16] . Taking an axiomatic approach, the geometric averaging fusion is proved to be the only learning rule satisfying some natural axioms [19] . An optimization-based interpretation of this rule is presented in [15] , using dual averaging method with properly chosen proximal functions. Finite-time convergence rates are investigated independently in [13, 16, 18] . Both [13] and [17] consider time-varying networks, with slightly different network models. Specifically, [13] assumes that the union of every consecutive B networks is strongly connected, while [17] considers random networks.
The prior work implicitly assumes that the networked agents are reliable in the sense that they correctly follow the specified learning rules. However, in some practical multiagent networks, this assumption may not hold. For example, in social networks, it is possible that some agents are adversarial, and try to prevent the true state from being learned by the good agents. Thus, this paper focuses on the fault-tolerant version of the non-Bayesian framework proposed in [4] . In particular, we assume that an unknown subset of agents may suffer Byzantine faults. An agent suffering Byzantine fault may not follow the pre-specified algorithms/protocols, and can misbehave arbitrarily. For instance, a faulty agent may lie to other agents. In addition, a faulty agent is assumed to have a complete knowledge of the system, including the network topology, the local functions of all the non-faulty agents, the algorithm specification of the non-faulty agents, the execution of the algorithm, the private signals of all the non-faulty agents, and contents of messages the other agents send to each other. The faulty agents may collude to prevent the nonfaulty agents from achieving their goal. An alternative fault model, where some agents may unexpectedly cease computing and communicate with each other asynchronously, is considered in our companion work [22] . Recent work [23, 24] consider a closely related problem (multi-agent target tracking) in the presence of adversarial noise rather than the adversarial agents. The Byzantine fault-tolerance problem was introduced by Pease et al. [25] and has attracted intensive attention from researchers [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . Our goal is to design algorithms that enable all the non-faulty agents to learn the underlying true state asymptotically.
The existing non-Bayesian learning algorithms [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] are not robust to Byzantine agents, since the malicious messages sent by the Byzantine agents are indiscriminately utilized in the local belief updates. To prevent the network from being completely controlled by the Byzantine agents, some messages filtering mechanism is needed. On the other hand, the incorporation of Byzantine consensus is non-trivial, since the message filtering typically is a function of the exchanged messages, which themselves are "functions" of (i) the malicious behaviors of Byzantine agents (a message may be sent by a Byzantine agent) and (ii) the random private signals collected in the network (a message may contain the information of these signals). Thus, during the information propagation, the Byzantine agents can create arbitrary and unspecified dependency among iterations. Contributions We propose two learning rules. In our learning rules, each non-faulty agent keeps a local variable which is a stochastic vector over the possible states. Entries of this stochastic vector can be viewed as the scores assigned to the corresponding states by that agent. We say a non-faulty agent learns the underlying truth if it assigns one to the true state and zeros to the wrong states asymptotically.
-We first propose an update rule wherein each agent iteratively updates its score vector as (up to normalization) the product of (1) the likelihood of the cumulative private signals and (2) the weighted geometric average of the score vectors of its incoming neighbors and itself (using Byzantine multi-dimensional consensus). In contrast to the existing algorithms [13, 16] , where only the current private signal is used in the update, our proposed algorithm relies on the cumulative private signals. The use of cumulative private signals is counterintuitive at first glance. It turns out that cumulative observations helps us deal with the aforementioned arbitrary and unspecified dependency caused by the Byzantine agents. Under reasonable assumptions on the underlying network structure and the global identifiability of the network, we show that all the non-faulty agents asymptotically agree on the true state almost surely.
-Due to the adoption of Byzantine multi-dimensional consensus, the computation complexity per agent of the first learning rule is high. The network identifiability condition assumed also scales poorly in the number of possible states m. Observing this, we propose a modification of our first learning rule. The complexity per iteration per agent of the modified rule is O(m 2 n log n), where n is the number of agents in the network. It requires a less restrictive network identifiability condition. In addition, this improved condition is independent of m.
Outline The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the problem formulation. Section 3 briefly reviews existing results on vector Byzantine consensus, and matrix representation. Our first algorithm and its correctness analysis are presented in Sect. 4. The modified learning rule and its correctness analysis are summarized in Sect. 5. Section 6 concludes the paper, and discusses possible extensions.
Problem formulation
Network model Our network model is similar to the model used in [30, 32] . We consider a synchronous system. A collection of n agents/nodes are connected by a directed network
. . , n} and E is the collection of directed edges. For each i ∈ V, let I i denote the set of incoming neighbors of agent i. Later in this paper, we will characterize sufficient conditions on the network for our learning rules to work. Throughout this paper, we use the terms agent and node interchangeably.
Byzantine fault
We consider a canonical fault model in distributed computing-the Byzantine fault model [33] . In Byzantine fault model, it is assumed that in any execution up to f agents suffer Byzantine faults. For a given execution, let F denote the set of Byzantine agents, and N denote the set of non-faulty agents. Throughout this paper, we assume that f and n satisfy the condition implicitly imposed by the given topology conditions mentioned later. We assume that each non-faulty agent knows f , but does not know the actual number of faulty agents |F|. 1 Note that |F| ≤ f and |N | ≥ n− f since at most f agents may fail. The set of faulty agents may be different across executions, but is fixed within an execution. An agent suffering Byzantine fault may not follow the pre-specified algorithms, and can misbehave arbitrarily. For instance, a faulty agent may lie to other agents arbitrarily. But we do assume that a message receiver knows exactly the message's sender. The Byzantine agents are also assumed to have complete knowledge of system, including the network topology, underlying running algorithm, the states or even the entire history. The faulty agents may collude to prevent the non-faulty agents from achieving their goal [33] .
Observation model Our observation model is identical to the model used in [4, 13, 19] . Let Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ m } denote a set of m environmental states, which we call hypotheses. In the tth iteration, each agent independently obtains a private signal about the environmental state θ * , which is initially unknown to every agent in the network. Each agent i knows the structure of its private signal, which is represented by a collection of parameterized marginal dis-
is the distribution of private signal when θ is the true state, and S i is the finite private signal space. For each θ ∈ Θ,
be the private signal observed by agent i in iteration t, and let s t = {s 1 t , s 2 t , . . . , s n t } be the signal profile at time t (i.e., signals observed by the agents in iteration t). Given an environmental state θ , the signal profile s t is generated according to the joint distribution 1 
. In addition, let s i 1,t be the signal history up to time t for agent i = 1, . . . , n, and let s 1,t = {s 1 1,t , s 2 1,t , . . . , s n 1,t } be the signal profile history up to time t.
Byzantine consensus
In this section, we briefly review relevant exsting results on Byzantine consensus. Byzantine consensus has attracted significant amount of attention [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] 34] . While the past work mostly focus on scalar inputs, the more general vector (or multi-dimensional) inputs have been studied recently [29, 31, 34] . Complete communication networks are considered in [31, 34] , where tight conditions on the number of agents are identified. Incomplete communication networks are studied in [29] . Closer to the non-Bayesian learning problem is the class of iterative approximate Byzantine consensus algorithms, where each agent is only allowed to exchange information about its state with its neighbors. In particular, our learning algorithms build upon Byz-Iter algorithm proposed in [29] and a simple algorithm proposed in [30] for iterative Byzantine consensus with vector inputs and scalar inputs, respectively, in incomplete networks. A matrix representation of the non-faulty agents' states evolution under Byz-Iter algorithm is provided by [29] , which also captures the dynamics of the simple algorithm with scalar inputs in [30] . To make this paper self-contained, in this section, we briefly review the algorithm Byz-Iter and its matrix representation.
Algorithm Byz-Iter [29]
Algorithm Byz-Iter is based on Tverberg's Theorem [35] .
The proper partition in Theorem 1, and the points in
For convenience of presenting our algorithm in Sect. 4, we present Byz-Iter (described in Algorithm 2) below using One-Iter (described in Algorithm 1) as a primitive. The parameter x i passed to One-Iter at agent i, and y i returned by One-Iter are both m-dimensional vectors. Let v i be the state of agent i that will be iteratively updated, with v i t being the state at the end of iteration t and v i 0 being the input of agent i. In each iteration t ≥ 1, a non-faulty agent performs the steps inOne-Iter. In particular, in the message receiving step, if a message is not received from some neighbor, that neighbor must be faulty, as the system is synchronous. In this case, the missing message values are set to some default value. Faulty agents may deviate from the algorithm specification arbitrarily. In Byz-Iter, the value returned by One-Iter at agent i is assigned to v i t . 7 Compute y i as follows:
Remark 1 Note that for each agent i ∈ N , the computation complexity per iteration is at least
Algorithm 2: Algorithm Byz-Iter [29] : tth iteration at agent i
In the worst case, ||I i | + 1| = n, and
Since our first learning rule is based on Algorithm Byz-Iter, the computation complexity of our first proposed algorithm is also high. Nevertheless, our first learning rule contains our main algorithmic ideas. More importantly, this learning rule can be modified such that the computation complexity per iteration per agent is O(m 2 n log n). Specifically, the modified rule adopts the scalar Byzantine consensus instead of the mdimensional consensus.
Correctness of algorithm Byz-Iter
We briefly summarize the aspects of correctness proof of Algorithm 2 from [29] that are necessary for our subsequent discussion. By using the Tverberg points in the update of v i t above, effectively, the extreme message values (that may potentially be sent by faulty agents) are trimmed away. Informally speaking, trimming certain messages can be viewed as ignoring (or removing) incoming links that carry the outliers. [29] shows that the effective communication network thus obtained can be characterized by a "reduced graph" of G(V, E), defined below. It is important to note that the nonfaulty agents do not know the identity of the faulty agents. It turns out that the effective communication network is potentially time-varying (partly) due to time-varying behavior of faulty nodes. Assumption 1 below states a condition that is sufficient for reaching approximate Byzantine vector consensus using Algorithm 1 [29] .
i.e., γ m is the minimum source component size among all the m-dimensional reduced graphs. Note that γ m ≥ 1 if Assumption 1 holds for a given m.
Theorem 2 [29] Suppose Assumption 1 holds for a given m ≥ 1. Under Algorithm Byz-Iter, all the non-faulty agents (agents in N ) reach consensus asymptotically, i.e.,
The proof of Theorem 2 relies crucially on a matrix representation of the state evolution.
Matrix representation [29]
Let |F| = φ (thus, 0 ≤ φ ≤ f ). Without loss of generality, assume that agents 1 through n −φ are non-faulty, and agents n − φ + 1 to n are Byzantine.
Lemma 1 [29] Suppose Assumption 1 holds for a given m ≥ 1. The state updates performed by the non-faulty agents in the tth iteration (t ≥ 1) can be expressed as
where
and (t, t +1) = I. Note that (t, r ) is a backward product. Using prior work on coefficients of ergodicity [36] , under Assumption 1, it has been shown [29, 37] that lim t≥r , t→∞
where ß(r ) ∈ R n−φ is a row stochastic vector, and 1 is the column vector with each entry being 1. Recall that χ m is the total number of m-dimensional reduced graphs of G(V, E), and β m is defined in Lemma 1, and φ |F|. The convergence rate in (3) is exponential.
Recall that γ m is defined in (1) . The next lemma is a consequence of the results in [29] .
Lemma 2 [29] For any r ≥ 1, there exists a reduced graph
Tight topological condition for scalar iterative Byzantine consensus
The above analysis shows that Assumption 1 is sufficient for achieving Byzantine consensus iteratively. For the special case when m = 1,(i.e., the inputs provided at individual non-faulty agents are scalars) it has been shown [30] that Assumption 1 is also necessary. 
In addition, it has been show that the dynamic of the nonfaulty agents states admits the same matrix representation as in Sect. 3.3 with the reduced graph being 1-dimensional reduced graph defined in Definition 1.
With the above background on Byzantine vector consensus, we are now ready to present our first algorithm and its analysis.
Byzantine fault-tolerant non-Bayesian learning (BFL)
In this section, we present our first learning rule, named Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Non-Bayesian Learning (BFL). In BFL, each non-faulty agent i keeps a local variable which is a stochastic vector over the possible states, denoted by μ i ∈ R m . Entries of this stochastic vector, i.e., μ i (θ ) for θ ∈ {θ 1 , . . . , θ m }, can be viewed as the scores assigned to the corresponding states by that agent. We refer to these stochastic vectors as score vectors. Since no signals are observed before the execution of an algorithm, the score vector μ i is initially set to be uniform over the set Θ, i.e., μ i
Recall that θ * is the true environmental state.
We say a non-faulty agent learns the underlying truth θ * if it assigns one to the true state and zeros to the wrong states asymptotically, i.e., for every non-faulty agent i ∈ N ,
where a.s. denotes almost surely. BFL modifies the existing geometric averaging update rules [13, 14, 16, 18] to deal with Byzantine agents. Specifically, in each iteration we use the likelihood of the cumulative private signals (instead of the current private signals only) to update the local score vectors.
For t ≥ 1, the steps to be performed by agent i in the tth iteration are listed below, where log μ i t−1 means entry-wise taking log of the score vector μ i t−1 . Note that faulty agents can deviate from the algorithm specification. The algorithm below uses One-Iter presented in the previous section as a primitive. Recall that s i 1,t is the cumulative private signals up to iteration t. Since the private signals of a given agent are i.i.d., it holds that i (s i 1,t |θ) = t r =1 i (s i r |θ). So i (s i 1,t |θ) can be computed iteratively. In addition, comparing to learning rules in [13, 14, 16, 18] , in our BFL, each agent keeps only one additional variable to keep track of the cumulative likelihood, whose update only requires one multiplication operation per state/hypothesis.
Algorithm 4: BFL: Iteration t ≥ 1 at agent i
Remark 2 Note that the cumulative likelihood i (s i 1,t |θ) may approach zero, which may cause some implementation issue of BFL. One possible way to resolve this implementation issue is to normalize the cumulative likelihood, i.e.,
where Nor i t is the normalization constant applied by agent i at time t.
The main difference of Algorithm 4 with respect to the algorithms in [13, 14, 16, 18] is that (i) our algorithm uses a Byzantine consensus iteration as a primitive (in line 1), and (ii) i (s i 1,t |θ) used in line 5 is the likelihood for private signals from iteration 1 to t (the previous algorithms instead use i (s i t |θ) here). Observe that the consensus step is being performed on log of the score vector, with the result being stored as η i t (in line 1) and used in line 4 to compute the new scores.
Recalling the matrix representation of the Byz-Iter algorithm as per Lemma 1, we can write the following equivalent representation of line 1 of Algorithm 4.
where A[t] is a row stochastic matrix whose properties are specified in Lemma 1. In addition, A[t] can be viewed as the filtering functions of the exchanged messages (score vectors), which are themselves "functions" of (i) the malicious behaviors of Byzantine agents (a message may be sent by a Byzantine agent) and (ii) the random private signals collected in the network (a message may contain the information of these signals). Thus, during the information propagation, the Byzantine agents can create arbitrary and unspecified dependency among the iterations and the aggregated scores. In contrast, the corresponding matrices in [13, 14, 16, 18] do not depend on the exchanged messages.
Identifiability
In the absence of agent failures [4] , for the networked agents to detect the true hypothesis θ * , it is sufficient to assume that G(V, E) is strongly connected, and that θ * is globally identifiable. That is, for any θ = θ * , there exists a node j ∈ V such that the Kullback-Leiber divergence between the true marginal j (·|θ * ) and j (·|θ), denoted by D j (·|θ * )|| j (·|θ) , is nonzero; equivalently,
where D j (·|θ * )|| j (·|θ) is defined as
Since θ * may change from execution to execution, (6) is required to hold for any choice of θ * . Intuitively speaking, if any pair of states θ 1 and θ 2 can be distinguished by at least one agent in the network, then sufficient information exchange over strongly connected network will enable every agent to distinguish θ 1 and θ 2 . However, in the presence of Byzantine agents, a stronger global identifiability condition is required as the information exchange is obstructed by the Byzantine agents. The following assumption builds upon Assumption 1. 
In contrast to (6) , where the summation is taken over all the agents in the network, in (8) , the summation is taken over agents in the source component only. Intuitively, the condition imposed by Assumption 2 is that all the agents in the source component can detect the true state θ * collaboratively. If iterative consensus is achieved, the accurate scores can be propagated from the source component to every other non-faulty agent in the network.
Remark 3
We will show later that when Assumption 2 holds, BFL algorithm enables all the non-faulty agents asymptotically assign scores one to the true state θ * almost surely. That is, Assumption 2 is a sufficient condition for a consensusbased non-Bayesian learning algorithm to exist. However, Assumption 2 is not necessary, observing that Assumption 1 (upon which Assumption 2 builds) is not necessary for m-dimensional Byzantine consensus algorithms to exist, as illustrated by our second learning rule (described later). Nevertheless, BFL contains our main algorithmic and analytical ideas. In addition, BFL provides an alternative learning rule for the failure-free setting (where no fault-tolerant consensus primitives are needed).
Convergence results
Our proof parallels the structure of a proof in [13] , but with some key differences to take into account our update rule for the score vector. For any θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ Θ, and any i ∈ V, define ψ i t (θ 1 , θ 2 ) and L t (θ 1 , θ 2 ) ∈ R n−φ as follows
where L i t (θ 1 , θ 2 ) is the ith entry of L t (θ 1 , θ 2 ). To show Algorithm 4 solves (4), we will show that
which implies that
i.e., all non-faulty agents asymptotically concentrate their scores on the true hypothesis θ * . We do this by investigating the dynamics of the score vectors which is represented compactly in a matrix form. For each θ = θ * , and each i ∈ N , we have
where equality (a) follows from (5) and the update of μ i in Algorithm 4, and the last equality follows from (9) and the fact that the private signals are i.i.d. for each agent. Let ψ t (θ, θ * ) ∈ R n−φ be the vector with the ith entry being ψ i t (θ, θ * ) for all i ∈ N . Recall that L r (θ, θ * ) ∈ R n−φ is the vector that stacks all L i r (θ, θ * ) for i ∈ N . The evolution of ψ(θ, θ * ) can be compactly written as
Expanding (11), we get ψ t (θ, θ * ) = (t, 1)ψ 0 (θ, θ * )
For each θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ V, define H i (θ, θ * ) ∈ R n−φ as
Let H ∈ C be an arbitrary reduced graph with source component S H . Define C 0 and C 1 as
The constant C 0 serves as an universal upper bound on | log i (w i |θ 1 ) i (w i |θ 2 ) | for all choices of θ 1 and θ 2 , all signals and all agents. Intuitively, the constant C 1 is the minimal detection capability of the source component under Assumption 2.
Due to |Θ| = m < ∞ and |S i | < ∞ for each i ∈ N , we know that C 0 < ∞. Besides, it is easy to see that −C 0 ≤ 0 (thus, C 0 ≥ 0). In addition, under Assumption 2, we have C 1 > 0. Now we present a key lemma for our main theorem.
Lemma 3
Under Assumption 2, for any θ = θ * , it holds that
As it can be seen later, the proof of Lemma 3 is different from the analogous lemma in [13] .
Theorem 5 When Assumption 2 holds, each non-faulty agent i ∈ N concentrates its score on the true hypothesis θ * almost surely, i.e., μ i t (θ )
Proof Consider any θ = θ * . Recall from (12) that ψ t (θ, θ * ) = (t, 1)ψ 0 (θ, θ * )
The last equality holds as μ i 0 is uniform, and ψ i 0 (θ, θ * ) = 0 for each i ∈ N .
Since the supports of i (·|θ) and i (·|θ * ) are the whole signal space S i , which are finite, for each agent i ∈ N , it holds that i (w i |θ) i (w i |θ * ) < ∞ for each w i ∈ S i , and
By (16) , we know that |
Due to the finiteness of n−φ j=1 π j (r + 1)H j (θ, θ * ), we are able to add to and subtract r 1 n−φ j=1 π j (r + 1)H j (θ, θ * ) from (12) . We get
For each i ∈ N , we have
Our convergence proof has similar structure as the analysis in [13] . From Lemma 3, we know that
Next we show that the second term of the right hand side of (18) decreases quadratically in t. (15) and (13)
Therefore, by (18) , (19) and (20) , almost surely, the following hold
− − → 0 for i ∈ N and θ = θ * , proving Theorem 5.
Remark 4
From the proof of Theorem 5, we know that the asymptotic convergence rate of the local variable μ i is O exp −Ct 2 , where C is some constant. At first glance, it seems that this asymptotic convergence rate directly contradicts Stein's Lemma which states that the best possible error decay rate w.r.t. the posterior distribution is O exp −Ĉt , whereĈ is a function of the KL-divergence of two distributions. However, we need to emphasize the fact that the local variable μ i used in our algorithm is NOT the posterior distribution. To see this, let us consider a special setting when n = 1 and the agent is non-faulty-the standard centralized hypothesis testing problem. According to Algorithm 4, the score vector μ is updated as
is the likelihood of all the signals s r (r = 1, . . . , t) collected up to time t. In contrast, the posterior distribution w.r.t. the cumulative signals s r (r = 1, . . . , t), denoted by P θ |s 1,t , is defined as
where P Θ is the fixed prior without seeing any signals. Thus, by definition,
Note that if we replace the cumulative likelihood by the average of the likelihood of the private signals collected so far, i.e.,
we are able to obtain the asymptotic rate O(exp (−Ct)) (using the derivation in the proof of Lemma 3) which is similar to that in the failure-free setting [12, 15, 16] . That is, using cumulative likelihood may not lead to faster convergence rate. Our interests in cumulative likelihood (as well as the averaging version) lies in its "robustness" to adversarial attacks when combined with Byzantine consensus iteration.
We now prove our key lemma-Lemma 3. Henceforth, for ease of exposition, we drop the subscript of β. (9), we have
Proof of Lemma 3 By
We prove (21) in Appendix A. Thus, we can rewrite the upper bound of L i r (θ, θ * ) as follows.
Thus, adding to and subtracting 1
n−φ j=1 π j (r + 1) r k=1 L j k (θ, θ * ) from the first term on the right hand side of (18), we can get
For the first term of the right hand side of (23), we have
Thus, for every sample path, we have
For the second term of the right hand side of (23), we will show that
i.e., almost surely for any > 0 there exists sufficiently large t( ) such that ∀ t ≥ t( ),
We prove this by dividing r into two ranges {1, . . . , √ t} and
For the first term of the right hand side of (26), we have
n−φ j=1 π j (r + 1) (2rC 0 ) by (13) and (22)
Thus, there exists t 1 ( ) such that for all t ≥ t 1 ( ), it holds that
For the second term of the right hand side of (26), we have 
Conclusion
This paper addresses the problem of consensus-based non-Bayesian learning over multi-agent networks when an unknown subset of agents may be adversarial (Byzantine). We propose two learning rules. In our first update rule, each agent updates its score vector as (up to normalization) the product of (1) the likelihood of the cumulative private signals and (2) the weighted geometric average of the score vectors of its incoming neighbors and itself. Under reasonable assumptions on the underlying network structure and the global identifiability of the network, we show that all the nonfaulty agents asymptotically agree on the true state almost surely. Although the asymptotic convergence rate is shown to be double exponential, the physical meaning of this rate might be limited. In fact, using cumulative likelihood might make higher moments very large and affect the concentration of the "score" vectors maintained by the non-faulty agents. Throughout this paper, we assume that consensus among non-faulty agents needs to be achieved. Although this is necessary for the family of consensus-based algorithms (by definition), this is not the case for the non-faulty agents to collaboratively learn the true state in general. Indeed, there is a tradeoff between the capability of the network to reach consensus and the tight condition of the network detectability. For instance, if the network is disconnected, then information cannot be propagated across the connected components. Thus, the non-faulty agents in each connected component have to be able to learn the true state. We leave investigating the above tradeoff as future work.
A proof of Eq. (21)
First it is easy to see that max θ 1 ,θ 2 ∈Θ;θ 1 =θ 2
Let (θ 1 ,θ 2 ) andw i be the hypotheses ordered pair and the private signal such that max θ 1 ,θ 2 ∈Θ;θ 1 =θ 2
If log i (w i |θ 1 ) i (w i |θ 2 ) < 0, it holds that log i (w i |θ 1 )
If log i (w i |θ 1 ) i (w i |θ 2 ) ≥ 0, then log i (w i |θ 1 )
Equations (30), (31) and (32) together prove (21) .
